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Abstract: A deontological model of legal ethics took shape over the 
course of the Middle Ages and early modern period, thanks to 
contributions from both jurisprudence and moral theology. With bans on 
defending unjust causes and resorting to unjust means to defend a cause, 
the defense lawyer became part of a legal process that sought to ascertain 
the truth – a key contributor to the administration of justice. However, 
jurists and theologians made some compromises when it came to these 
rules, affirming that a lawyer also had a duty to defend his client to the 
fullest. 
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 
∗ This is the written version of a lesson held on 11 January 2017; as such, it shall be 
presented in the same format. The lesson was part of an advanced course entitled 
Liability, rights and freedom in trials: judges, lawyers and parties organized for the ‘Cesare 
Beccaria’ Ph.D. Program in Legal Studies at the University of Milan. Various sources were 
referenced during the lesson, and as such the necessary footnotes shall be included here. 
For the specific references and details in §§ 1 to 6, please see R. Bianchi Riva, L’avvocato 
non difenda cause ingiuste. Ricerche sulla deontologia forense in età medievale e 
moderna. Parte prima. Il medioevo, Milano, 2012; Ead., La coscienza dell’avvocato. La 
deontologia forense fra diritto e etica in età moderna, Milano, 2015; Ead., Il dovere di 
verità fra tecniche della difesa e deontologia forense nel medioevo e nell’età moderna / 
The duty to the truth: defense techniques and legal ethics in the Middle Ages and early 
modern period, in «Italian Review of Legal History», 1, n. 4. New material can be found in 
§§ 7 and 8; in particular, the concluding remarks originate from the discussion that 
followed the lesson. For a bibliography, please see Officium advocati, L. Mayali, A. Padoa 
Schioppa, D. Simon (edd.), Frankfurt am Main, 2000; Un progetto di ricerca sulla storia 
dell’avvocatura, G. Alpa, R. Danovi (edd.), Bologna, 2003; Figure del foro lombardo tra XVI 
e XIX secolo, C. Danusso, C. Storti Storchi (edd.), Milano, 2006; L'arte del difendere. 
Allegazioni avvocati e storie di vita a Milano tra Sette e Ottocento, M.G. Di Renzo Villata 
(ed.), Milano, 2006; J.A. Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession. Canonists, 
Civilians, and Courts, Chicago and London 2008; Avvocati e avvocatura nell'Italia 
dell'Ottocento, A. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.), Bologna, 2009.  
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1. Introduction: Medieval and early modern legal ethics  
The role of a defense lawyer has always been quite ambiguous. Indeed, 
a defense lawyer is often at the center of conflicting values and interests, 
which are sometimes even openly at odds. Thus, he is continually forced to 
make choices.  
On the one hand, a lawyer contributes to the administration of justice 
through his defense by helping the judge reach the correct ruling. The 
judge, while technically attempting to reconstruct the formal legal truth, 
always aspires to get as close as possible to the substantive truth. On the 
other hand, a lawyer promotes and defends the interests of his client, who 
is not interested in a just sentence but rather a favorable one.  
Indeed, this ‘dual loyalty’ is part of the current judicial system: loyalty to 
the client on the one hand, to the judicial system itself on the other. 
As stated in the Code of Conduct for Italian Lawyers (art. 1), ethical rules 
are ‘essential’ in order that a balance can be struck between these two 
ostensibly contrasting principles. Only by respecting the Code of Conduct 
can lawyers maintain this dual loyalty to the defense of their client and to 
justice itself. 
From a historical perspective, in what ways and to what extent have 
ethical rules achieved a balance between these values? And what role has 
been assigned to the lawyer as a result of this balance? 
First and foremost, it must be clarified that a deontological model of 
legal ethics began to take shape in the Middle Ages and early modern 
period thanks to contributions from both jurisprudence and moral theology 
(although it is a well-known fact that the term ‘deontology’ was coined by 
Jeremy Bentham, we shall nonetheless use this expression in reference to 
the Middle Ages and early modern period, as many of the principles and 
issues at the center of the current debate were dealt with in those 
centuries). 
Morality has contributed so much to the formation of this model that it 
still influences the current debate over whether ethical rules are legal or 
moral in nature. Indeed, up until the enactment of the Code of Conduct for 
Italian Lawyers in 1997, these rules were considered essentially moral in 
nature; as such, they were interpreted subjectively and at one’s own 
discretion, to paraphrase the criticism of Remo Danovi. Only upon approval 
of the Code of Conduct was it possible to move beyond this view and 
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establish the legal nature of ethical rules for lawyers (despite the fact that, 
as the term itself suggests, their content was primarily ethical in nature). 
This was subsequently reaffirmed by Italy’s Court of Cassation.  
Regulation of the legal profession was shaped by a broad range of 
sources: texts from Justinian’s compilation and canonist collections, 
scholarly contributions to the doctrine of civil law and canon law, the 
ordines iudiciorum, royal decrees, statute law; but also works in moral 
theology, in particular the Summa theologiae by Thomas Aquinas (IIa IIae q. 
71), the summae confessorum, and texts from the School of Salamanca. 
In the early modern period, these sources gradually converged in 
treatises on advocacy, which took a specialized look at the legal profession 
beginning at the end of the fifteenth century. Mostly written by lawyers 
and judges, and sometimes even by ecclesiastics, these treatises 
represented scholarly work conducted outside of a university context. The 
aim was not only to provide defense lawyers with practical advice for their 
everyday practice, but also to collect the rules of professional conduct in 
one place, which up until then had been scattered among various legal and 
theological texts (yet another reason for this was to curb abuses and 
failings among lawyers, which the writers themselves reported as being 
quite frequent). 
Thus, these precepts applied to the internal forum just as much as they 
did to the external forum. In this regard, it is important to remember that 
the separation of law and morals began in the sixteenth century but would 
not be complete until the end of the eighteenth century; and though this 
process would eventually lead to a distinction between legal rules and 
moral rules, it meant that between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the entire debate over legal ethics was centered around the 
potential conflict between the internal and external forums. 
In their treatises, these writers set out the duties of lawyers in terms of 
their relationships with colleagues, judges and clients. And while they have 
been adapted to the times, these same principles and rules can still be 
found today in the Code of Conduct for Italian Lawyers. 
Some specific examples are the duty of loyalty (art. 10) and the duty not 
to disclose confidences and secrets (art. 13), the violation of which is a 
criminal offense (articles 380, 381 and 622 of the Italian Penal Code); the 
duties to carry out the profession with diligence (art. 12) and to represent 
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the client competently (art. 14), which not only ensures the quality of a 
lawyer’s professional performance, but also implies civil liability; the duty 
of independence (art. 9); and issues concerning legal fees (currently at the 
center of a legislative debate), in particular the ban on contingent fee 
agreements (art. 25). 
Other rules have undergone more significant changes since the Middle 
Ages and early modern period, including in the actual language used to 
describe them: specifically, I am referring to what was known in the age of 
the ius commune as bans on defending unjust causes and resorting to 
unjust means to defend a cause. These rules helped create a specific, 
deontological model of legal ethics in which the defense lawyer became 
part of a legal process that sought to ascertain the truth – a key contributor 
to the administration of justice. Today, we know these rules as the duty to 
act honestly and the duty to act truthfully. 
 
2. The lawyer’s oath. 
As stated above, the ban on defending unjust causes could be linked to 
the duty to act honestly, which is currently established in article 9 of the 
Code of Conduct (included among the other fundamental duties of a 
lawyer), as well as in article 88 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure and 
article 105 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, there 
was a rule in the previous Code of Conduct wherein this duty was 
described using similar words to those used in article 96 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure on vexatious/frivolous litigation (art. 6 of the 1997 Code of 
Conduct for Italian Lawyers). 
More of a general principle than it is a rule, it concerns all activities that 
a lawyer is to carry out during trial. It obliges the lawyer to contribute to 
the administration and efficiency of justice: that does not mean that a 
lawyer must make sacrifices in defending his client to the fullest, but rather 
that he must not defend the client to such an extent that he loses 
awareness of the institutional purpose of the trial. 
This principle was developed over the course of the Middle Ages 
through jurists’ reflections on the lawyer’s oath, which was required in 
accordance with Justinian’s constitution rem non novam of 530. Justinian 
wanted to avoid abuse of process: as such, the oath de calumnia was to be 
taken immediately after the litis contestatio to demonstrate that the 
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parties were acting in good faith. Lawyers were thereby bound not to 
accept the charge if they believed the cause was dishonest (improba), 
unfounded (penitus desperata) or fraudulent (ex mendacibus allegationibus 
composita); if such were to emerge during the trial, they were to 
immediately abandon their defense: 
 
Patroni autem causarum, qui utrique parti suum praestantes ingrediuntur 
auxilium, cum lis fuerit contestatam, post narrationem propositam et 
contradictionem obiectam in qualicumque iudicio maiore seu minore vel 
apud arbitros sive ex compromisso vel aliter datos vel electos sacrosanctis 
evangeliis tactis iuramentum praestent, quod omni quidem virtute sua 
omnique ope quod iustum et verum existimaverint clientibus suis inferre 
procurent, nihil studii relinquentes, quod sibi possibile est, non autem 
credita sibi causa cognita, quod improba sit vel penitus desperata et ex 
mendacibus adlegationibus composita, ipsi scientes prudentesque mala 
conscientia liti patrocinantur sed et si certamine procedente aliquid tale sibi 
cognitum fuerit, a causa recedant ab huiusmodi comunione sese penitus 
separantes1.  
 
Nonetheless, the oath seemed to have fallen into desuetude by the 
middle of the twelfth century. Indeed, the sources tell of an episode that 
reportedly centered around two of the four doctors studying under Irnerius 
and Emperor Frederick Barbarossa: according to Odofredus, the Emperor 
was said to have asked Bulgarus and Martinus whether an oath was still 
required and practiced in their time, and they answered that it had become 
customary not to take the oath in court: 
 
Or signori, in ista secunda parte huius legis nota quod dum quadam die 
dominus Fredericus senior quesivisset a domino Bulgaro et Martino: Dicatis 
mihi, ego intellexi quod lite contestata a litigatoribus, patroni causarum 
debent iurare quod non fovebunt iniquam litem, et si in processu cognoverit 
iniustam litem fovere clientulum suum, quod deferent causam illam: cur non 
facimus quod advocati in foro nostro ita iurent? Ad quod ipsi respondent 
hoc iure cavetur, licet consuetudine non habetur2.  
 
 
1 Cod. 1.3.4. 
2 Odofredus, Lectura super Codice, Lugduni, 1552, f. 133rb, n. 3.  
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A debate on the relationship between law and custom was already 
under way in the Bologna school, leading the glossators to describe this 
custom of not taking the oath de calumnia as a general custom, seeing as 
how it was in practice everywhere. According to the original distinction 
introduced by Bulgarus and then subsequently adapted by Johannes 
Bassianus, Azo and lastly Accursius, the glossators believed that this 
custom had nullified the constitution rem non novam. Indeed, according to 
Azo, 
 
generalis consuetudo pro hoc est, quod nec in Italia nec in Francia vides 
observari, quod iurent advocati in causis. Unde haec consuetudo tollit 
legem3. 
 
Medieval jurisprudence attempted to reinstate the oath-taking 
requirement in order to reaffirm the fundamental principles of the 
profession and curb abuse. What arguments were used to achieve this 
goal? 
The commentators continued in the glossators’ footsteps for what 
concerned the relationship between law and custom. They introduced a 
distinction between custom and desuetude: if a norm was constantly and 
repeatedly in practice, and that norm was different from the one provided 
for by written law, then it would nullify the written law; however, the mere 
inobservance of a written law would not nullify it. Therefore, as affirmed by 
Cynus (in reference to Pierre de Belleperche), the constitution rem non 
novam was to be considered still in force: 
 
Secundo quaeritur nunquid observandum sit quod haec lex dicit sic de iure 
isto scripto, sed Bul. dicit quod de consuetudine non servatur et sic de facto 
cum peteretur a beo iuramentum respondit. Sed Pe. dicit quod Bulg. male 
dixit, quia iura non abrogantur, licet non fuerint usitata, nisi consuetudo 
contraria irrepserit, nam si sic tollerentur leges, multae leges infortiati 
essent sublatae4. 
  
 
3 Azo, Lectura Codicis, Parisiis 1577, f. 171.  
4 Cynus Pistoriensis, Super Codice et Digesto veteri Lectura, Lugduni, 1547, Comm. in 
Cod. 3.1.14, f. 94va, n. 3.  
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The canonists maintained that the institute was still in force based on 
the principles of canon law. It should be noted that on a local level, canon 
law also provided for oaths that were similar to the Justinian oath, and that 
in 1274, it became required for all lawyers who worked in ecclesiastical 
courts to take an oath (nonetheless, this rule was not included in the Liber 
Sextus). Failure to comply would result in disbarment from the profession: 
 
Properandum nobis visum est, ut malitiosis litium protractionibus 
occurratur: quod speramus efficaciter provenire, si eos, qui circa judicia 
suum ministerium exhibent, ad id congruis remediis dirigamus. Cum igitur 
ea, quae ad hoc salubriter fuerant circa patronos causarum legali sanctione 
provisa, desuetudine abolita videantur: nos sanctionem eamdem, praesentis 
redivivae constitutionis suffragio, cum aliqua tamen adiectione, nec non et 
modera mine renovantes, statuimus ut omnes et singuli advocationis 
officium in foro ecclesiastico, sive apud sedem apostolicam, sive alibi, 
exercentes, praestent, tactis sacrosanctis evangeliis, iuramentum, quod in 
omnibus causis ecclesiasticis, et in aliis in eodem foro tractandis, quarum 
assumpserunt patrocinium, vel assument, omni virtute sua, omnique ope, id 
quod verum et iustum existimaverint, suis clientulis inferre procurent; nihil 
in hoc studii, quod eis sit possibile, relinquentes, quodque in quacumque 
parte judicii eis innotuerit improbam fore causam, quam in sua fide 
receperant, amplius non patrocinabuntur eidem, immo ab ea omnino 
recedent, a communione illius se penitus separantes, reliquis quae circa 
haec sunt in eadem sanctione statuta, inviolabiliter observandis5.  
 
Although the canonists did not contest the glossators’ theory – namely, 
that the custom of not taking an oath could nullify the law – they 
nonetheless warned that the enforcement of such a rule would provide 
lawyers with an occasion of sin. Indeed, while Hostiensis referred to the 
custom of not taking the oath de calumnia as an example of a very 
widespread («generalissima») custom, he believed that aequitas canonica 
called for an exception to the rule (which, as mentioned above, would have 
nullified the constitution rem non novam): such was justified by the need 
to guarantee honest conduct on the part of defense lawyers: 
 
 
5 Concilium Lugdunense II - 1274, in Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, J. Alberigo, 
P. P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi (edd.), Bologna, 1991, p. 324. 
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per hanc dicunt abrogatam legem quae dicit quod patroni sive advocati 
iurare debent in initio litis quod contra conscientiam causam non foveant 
desperatam Cod. de iud. rem non novam unde dixit Bul. Quod iuramentum 
lege cavetur sed in consuetudine non habetur […] quamvis advocati pro 
magna parte cavilosi et malignari volentes et sibi adinvicem deferentes hanc 
glossam Bul. Amplectant, ipsam tamen non approbo, quia contra legem 
illam non puto valere consuetudinem vel desuetudinem, sicut nec valet 
consuetudo quod de calumnia non iuretur infra de iura. calu. ceterum et est 
ratio in utroque ne per talem consuetudinem peccata mortalia nutriant et 
quicquid velant vel palliant pessimi advocati quamvis non iurent si contra 
conscientiam foveant edificant ad geennam6. 
 
The fact that the oath was not actually taken led to two consequences. 
On the one hand, there was an institutional response. Local judicial 
systems developed alternative or additional kinds of oaths in place of the 
one required by the ius commune. 
European monarchies required lawyers to take an oath, not only to 
remind them of their fundamental duties, but also to make it clear that 
they were subservient to the judges. 
For example, as part of his efforts to centralize power, Frederick II 
introduced an oath that was very similar to the Justinian oath, though 
much more detailed. It was to be taken upon admission to the legal 
profession and renewed yearly: 
 
Advocatos tam in curia nostra quam etiam coram provinciarum justitiariis et 
bajulis statuendos necnon et per partes singulas regni nostri, ante receptum 
officium tactis sacrosanctis evangeliis corporalia volumus sacramenta 
prestare: quod partes quarum patrocinium susceperint cum omni fide et 
veritate sine tergiversatione aliqua adjuvare curabunt, ipsas de facto 
instruent, contra veram conscientiam nullatenus allegabunt, et quod causas 
non recipient desperatas, et si quas forte receperint partis fortasse 
mendaciis coloratas, que juste sibi in principio videbantur, et in processu 
judicii vel de facto vel de jure compareant ipsis injuste, ipsarum patrocinium 
incontinenti dimittent; sprete parti, prout priscis legibus et statutum, 
licentia convolandi ad alterius patrocinium deneganda. Jurabunt etiam quod 
 
6 Henricus de Segusio, Summa, Lugduni, 1542, f. 155ra, n. 11.  
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augmentum salarii in processu judicii non requirent nec de parte litis ineant 
pactiones7. 
 
The communes did the same thing. 
For example, the 1331 statute of Bergamo simply reaffirmed that the 
oath de calumnia was required, in accordance with the ius commune. In all 
probability, the only purpose for doing so was to strengthen the oath’s 
effect: 
 
Item statuerunt et ordinaverunt quod in qualibet causa, coram quacumque 
iudice ventilanda, iurare debeant partes de calumpnia. Et quod procuratores 
et advocati iurent quod malitiose non calumpniabuntur in causis, in quibus 
erunt advocati et procuratores. Que sacramenta prestentur in initio 
cuiuslibet cause8. 
 
Other communes introduced a lawyer’s oath in order to respond to 
specific needs. Such was the case in Lucca, where the statutes of 1308 
forbade lawyers from bringing or continuing with an appeal if they believed 
that the original sentence was just: 
 
Et omnibus iudicibus et causidicis lucanae Civitatis, qui feudum et 
beneficium a Comuni lucano vel Camera Lucani comunis habent, precipiam 
per sacramentum infra mensem mei introytus, ut nullum consulent 
appellare vel appellationem prosequi, nisi eidem iudici vel causidico videtur 
quod appellans iniuste fuerit condemnatus9. 
 
3. From the lawyer’s oath to the ban on defending unjust causes. 
Many of these oaths would meet the same fate as Justinian’s. 
In the sixteenth century, for example, Matthaeus de Afflictis recounted 
how not taking the oath had long been customary practice 
 
7 Constitutiones regni Siciliae a Friderico secundo apud Melfiam editae, in quibus leges 
tam a suis praedecessoribus quam ab ipso antea publicatae concluduntur, in Historia 
diplomatica Friderici Secundi, J.L.A. Huillard-Breholles (ed.), Paris, 1852-1861, vol. IV, parte 
I, pp. 1-178 (pp. 62-63).  
8 Lo Statuto di Bergamo del 1331, C. Storti Storchi (ed.), Milano, 1986, p. 107.  
9 Statuto del comune di Lucca dell’anno MCCCVIII, Lucca, 1867, p. 265.  
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(«vetustissima»), and how the rule in the Liber Augustalis requiring such an 
oath had fallen into desuetude at least a century beforehand10. 
This brings us to the second consequence of the inobservance of the 
oath: jurists independently redeveloped the rules contained in the oath’s 
wording, requiring that it be respected regardless of whether it had 
formally been taken or not. 
However, there was a change in the expression used to describe the 
causes that a lawyer was not allowed to defend. While the constitution 
rem non novam (as well as the majority of other legislative texts) spoke of 
causa improba or desperata, jurists now almost always referred to causa 
iniusta, taking their cue from theology. 
In his Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas affirmed that any lawyer who 
defended an unjust cause would commit a sin11. 
A lawyer was to rely on his own conscience to determine whether a 
cause was unjust and thus one that could not be defended. This meant that 
a lawyer could not defend a cause if, deep inside, he felt that it was 
‘unjust’. Indeed, the ban on defending unjust causes also entailed a ban on 
defending contra conscientiam. 
 
3.1. The definition of an ‘unjust cause’. 
The problem was when a legal action was juridically legitimate, but 
unjust according to the lawyer’s conscience. 
One clear example is a nudum pactum. According to Roman law, a mere 
promise does not give rise to action; however, it does oblige the promisor 
in conscience, and indeed canon doctrine recognized it as actionable. Could 
a lawyer defend someone who was taken to court because he had not 
honored his promise? Such a defense would have been legitimate from a 
juridical point of view, but in its essence it was still unjust. 
Another example can be found in so-called ‘natural obligations’. The 
debtor is not legally bound to fulfill such an obligation, but he is morally 
bound to do so (and indeed, in the Italian system, a creditor cannot take 
action against a debtor in order to enforce the fulfillment of a natural 
 
10 M. de Afflictis, In utriusque Siciliae, Neapolisque Sanctiones, et Constitutiones 
novissima Praelectio, Venetiis, 1588, f. 208vb, n. 21.  
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae q. 71 art. 3. 
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obligation, but in the event that the debtor fulfills the obligation of his own 
volition, he cannot reclaim the amount paid to the creditor). Could a 
lawyer defend a debtor who was taken to court because he had not 
fulfilled a natural obligation? 
In other words, it was a matter of determining what an ‘unjust cause’ 
really meant: only one which had no legal basis, or also one which went 
against a moral truth? 
Jurists tended to limit the category of unjust causes to those that had no 
legal basis. 
A good example of this can be found in the action for recovery of 
possession, as demonstrated by Innocent IV. Indeed, the legal system 
protected the possession of the spoliatus, even if he was not the rightful 
owner of the property; in this case, could a lawyer defend the spoliatus 
against the spoliator, even when the latter was actually the real owner 
(and thus the action for recovery of possession occurred in order to restore 
the property to its rightful owner)? 
According to Innocent IV, a lawyer could even defend a bad-faith 
spoliatus. He maintained the reference to a lawyer’s conscience, but he 
introduced a distinction between conscientia legis and conscientia hominis: 
when forbidding a lawyer to defend a cause that went against his 
conscience, one could not refer to the human conscience (understood as 
the ultimate goal of justice), but rather to the ratio of the laws (which 
presumably would emerge in the judge’s sentence): 
 
Advocatus licet faveat iniusto possessori olim qui petit restitui: non tamen 
dicitur propter hoc habere conscientiam lesam […] quia est pica et organum 
legis scripte: et advocatus non debet habere conscientiam hominis, sed 
legis: certe lex bona est si quis ea ratione utatur12. 
 
Indeed, the sentence would determine a posteriori whether the cause 
defended by the lawyer had been a just cause or not (and thus, whether he 
had violated ethical rules). 
 
12 Innocentius IV, Apparatus super V libris Decretalium, Lugduni 1543, Comm. in X 
2.1.14, f. 86vb, n. 6.  
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Theologians adopted a different solution, which was also outlined in 
treatises on the legal profession. 
In order to determine the justness or unjustness of a cause, a lawyer’s 
only point of reference was to be his own conscience, regardless of what 
the possible outcome of a dispute might be. 
Thus, returning to the example of the action for recovery of possession, 
the treatises stated that a lawyer could not defend the spoliatus in the 
event that the spoliator was without question the rightful owner13. 
A similar stance was adopted regarding the above-mentioned examples 
of a nudum pactum or natural obligation: a lawyer could not defend a 
person whose position was unjust «in foro conscientiae», even if the legal 
system technically protected that person14. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that any violation of this ban on 
defending unjust causes did not lead to legal sanctions. Indeed, the only 
consequence for a lawyer was that he would commit a sin. 
 
3.2. Doubtful causes. 
Jurists and theologians recognized that it was difficult to evaluate the 
justness, or better the unjustness of a cause in limine litis. Based on their 
common experience, they found that in the majority of cases, there were 
always some critical issues to address. 
A compromise would have to be reached in the practical application of 
the rule: in those frequent cases of doubt, a lawyer would be allowed to 
represent the defendant, as it was not his task to determine the justness or 
unjustness of the cause (the judge was responsible for doing that); rather, 
he was to defend the client in the best way possible (provided there were 
at least some grounds for taking on the case). 
In the fourteenth century, Albericus de Rosate concluded that if a 
defense lawyer accepted a charge despite harboring doubts about the 
justness of the cause, he would not commit a sin:  
 
13 E. Nazius, Dissertatio de conscientia advocati, Francofurti ad Viadrum, 1683, p. 60, n. 
17.  
14 G.P. Ala, Tractatus brevis de advocato, et causidico christiano, Mediolani, 1605, p. 
116; P.P. Guazzini, Tractatus moralis ad defensam animarum advocatorum, iudicum, 
reorum, Venetiis, 1650, p. 23a, n. 23 e ss..  
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ultimo quaero utrum advocatus peccet iuvando partem cum dubitat quod 
non sibi aperiat veritatem causae suae. Et videtur quod peccet […] Ad hoc 
facit quod dicitur vasallum non teneri iuvare dominum si dubitat utrum iuste 
moveat bellum vel non […] Circa hoc vide, quod non peccat, supponere enim 
debet, quod iudex causam diligenter examinabit, et pronuntiabit, quod 
iustum fuerit et aliud est in bello aliud in iudicio nam in bello viribus vincitur, 
in iudicio iuribus15. 
 
The only duty that the lawyer was obliged to uphold was to inform his 
client of his chances of winning the case. This was part of a more general 
duty to keep the client informed, which is still recognized today in article 
27 of the Code of Conduct. Giovanni Pietro Ala, a jurisconsult from 
Cremona, recommended the same thing in the early seventeenth century, 
when he wrote two treatises on what it meant to be a ‘good lawyer’16. 
 
4. Criminal trials: The duty to defend a client. 
When it came to criminal trials, jurists and theologians pondered what 
might be the ultimate test of a lawyer’s conscience: namely, what to do if 
the client were to confess to the lawyer that he committed the crime. 
This case presented a defense lawyer with two choices: either continue 
to defend the client, which might even mean hindering the search for 
truth; or withdraw his defense and help restore justice, which might even 
lead a lawyer to take the extreme measure of reporting the client to the 
authorities.  
In the same way seen above, jurists resolved this problem by referring 
to the judge’s sentence. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
Matthaeus de Afflictis affirmed that, even if the lawyer was aware of his 
client’s guilt, defending such a case would not go against professional rules 
as long as the judge acquitted the defendant in his sentence: 
 
 
15 Albericus de Rosate, In Primam Codicis Partem Commentarii, Venetiis, 1586 (rist. 
anast. Bologna, 1979), Comm. in Cod. 4.3.1, f. 185va, n. 9.  
16 Ala, Tractatus brevis de advocato, cit., p. 58.  
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si advocatus habet conscientiam quod Titius interfecit hominem et ex 
processu apparet qupd non fuit ipse, licet eum defendat, non dicitur facere 
contra conscientiam legis 17.  
 
Theologians affirmed that any lawyer who received a confession from 
his client could nonetheless continue with his client’s defense, and that he 
should seek an acquittal – or at least a reduction in the sentence – by 
pointing out procedural errors, for example. This was asserted in the 
middle of the sixteenth century by one of the most famous exponents of 
the School of Salamanca, Domingo de Soto; indeed, he believed that in the 
most serious of criminal trials, a lawyer could represent a defendant even if 
there was little to argue before the judge and the chances of an acquittal 
were slim, so long as the defendant did not represent a particular threat to 
society: 
 
Quando enim est causa mortis, aut sanguinis, aut ubi honor alicuius 
percìiclitatur […] in hisce casibus potissimum causa capitis, nisi reus 
perniciosissimus haberetur pium esset eius suscipere patrocinium, etiam si 
eius causa minoris esset probabilitatis18. 
  
Juan Pablo Xammar followed in the footsteps of Domingo de Soto. In a 
treatise on judges and lawyers published in 1639, the Catalan judge stated 
that a lawyer was to withdraw from a case only if there were no arguments 
to be made in the client’s defense («si nullum eum colore tueri posset»)19. 
In other words, the ban on defending unjust causes did not apply to 
criminal trials. Giuseppe Zanardelli would affirm as much at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when he limited the ban on defending unjust causes 
(he still used those words at the time) to civil cases only, citing that «in the 
criminal justice system, not only is it legitimate to defend an evil cause, it is 
obligatory, because humanity commands it, mercy demands it, custom 
establishes it, and the law requires it»20. 
 
 
17 de Afflictis, In utriusque Siciliae, Neapolisque Sanctiones, cit., f. 208ra, n. 10.  
18 D. de Soto, De iustitia et iure, Venetiis, 1584, p. 492a.  
19 J.P. Xammar, De officio iudicis et advocati, Barcinonae, 1639, f. 197vb, n. 41.  
20 G. Zanardelli, L’avvocatura. Discorsi (con alcuni inediti), Milano, 2003, p. 166.  
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4.1. Lawyer-client privilege. 
In the event that a lawyer decided to withdraw his defense, the problem 
was whether to reveal what he had learned and thereby ensure that truth 
prevailed, or maintain the secret but thereby obstruct identification of the 
culprit. 
Lawyer-client privilege was recognized as far back as the Middle Ages, 
when it was forbidden for a defense lawyer to reveal facts that he had 
learned while representing a client21, even if he was called to testify in 
court22, and despite the fact that the very act of withdrawing from the case 
would have made it clear that there were irreconcilable differences 
between the lawyer and the client. 
However, this duty of confidentiality was not as important as preventing 
serious harm from befalling third parties: for that reason, if it became 
necessary to disclose information provided by a client in order to avoid 
exposing the other party or the community to irreparable harm (the 
primary concern at the time was any crime of lèse-majesté, which 
threatened public order), then the lawyer was authorized (and actually 
required) to reveal that information. In any case, he was to make 
disclosures only to the extent necessary to prevent harm, which is still a 
rule today (art. 28 of the Code of Conduct)23. 
 
5. The ban on resorting to unjust means to defend a cause. 
Once a lawyer decided to represent a client, what defense strategies 
could he resort to based on the rules examined up to this point? In other 
words, were there any limits as to what he could do in defense of his 
client? 
These questions have to do with the ban on resorting to unjust means 
to defend a cause, which, as stated above, can be linked to today’s duty to 
act truthfully (art. 50 of the Code of Conduct). 
It should be noted that the duty to act truthfully is an ethical rule only, 
as a defense lawyer and defendant are not required to do so according to 
 
21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IIa IIae q. 71 art. 3. 
22 Statuti di Verona del 1327, S.A. Bianchi, R. Granuzzo (edd.), Roma, 1992, p. 324; V. 
De Franchis, Decisiones Sacri Regii Consilii Neapoletani, Venetiis, 1616, dec. 222, f. 122v. 
23 Xammar, De officio iudicis et advocato, cit., f. 197va, n. 39. 
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procedural rules. Although preliminary drafts of the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure considered including such a rule, the final version opted to 
require simply a generic duty to act fairly (the same applies to the Italian 
Code of Criminal Procedure): indeed, it was feared that the inclusion of a 
duty to act truthfully would have forced the lawyer and defendant to 
produce evidence contra se. 
In the Middle Ages and early modern period, canon law was used as the 
basis for affirming that a lawyer could resort to any defense techniques 
necessary to win a trial if it was a just cause. In other words, any means 
was justified if it meant that the justice would prevail. 
Indeed, the ordinary gloss on the Decretum, completed by the first half 
of the thirteenth century, allowed a lawyer to deceive the counterparty 
(«decipere adversarium suum»)24; in particular, the gloss on the Liber 
Sextus pointed out that «qui habet ius in principali, cavillationes et malitias 
adversarii potest per alias repellere»25. 
Canonist theory referred to the art of rhetoric – or at least, jurists and 
theologians would continue to come back to rhetoric as they debated 
defense strategies in the centuries that followed. Basically, lawyers were 
allowed to make their case in any number of ways, for example by 
embellishing their defenses with «colorata et persuasiva», because it had 
been observed that even if a certain topic was not entirely relevant to the 
dispute, it could nonetheless influence the judge’s opinion26. 
But was there any limit to what a lawyer could do with his oratory skills? 
Could he claim factual circumstances that did not actually correspond to 
reality? Or did he have to limit himself to providing a partial account of the 
facts or an incomplete description of what legal doctrine had to say about 
the issue? 
In that regard, the duty to act truthfully served as a limit. Out of respect 
for his key role in the administration of justice, a lawyer could not produce 
false evidence or make false statements during legal proceedings. This 
meant that he could not produce false documents, suborn witnesses, or 
 
24 Gl. insidijs ad Decr. C. 23 q. 2 c. 2 
25 Gl. malignantium ad VI 1. 6. 16. 
26 Ala, Tractatus brevis de advocato, cit., p. 45 
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procure a client to commit perjury (fraudulent conduct of this nature was a 
criminal offense). 
However, the duty to act truthfully did not require a lawyer to produce 
evidence if this might be detrimental to the client. Thomas Aquinas had 
already made this clear in his Summa theologiae, wherein he stated that 
the astute lawyer could conceal that which might be favorable to his 
opponent, making reference to an analogy between military defense and 
legal defense: 
 
militi vel duci exercitus licet in bello iusto ex insidiis agere ea quae facere 
debet prudenter occultando, non autem falsitatem fraudolenter faciendo 
[…] Unde et advocato defendendti causam iustam licet prodenter occultare 
ea quibus impediri posset processus eius, non autem licet ei aliqua falsitate 
uti27. 
  
Nonetheless, there was sometimes a very fine line between employing 
methods of argumentation (lawful) and resorting to falsehoods (unlawful). 
Alciatus highlighted just that in his commentary on de verborum 
significatione in the Digest, wherein he clarified that there was always an 
element of falsehood in sophistry: 
 
Cavillari variis modis accipitur. Cavillatur, qui calumniose agit. Cavillatur, qui 
breviter et false adversarium sermone captat, aut irridet. Cavillatur, qui 
sciens, ut suam sententiam tueatur, falsa prodit […] Sed an huiusmodi 
cavillationibus uti advocatum deceat? Et gravi viro convenit numquam uti 23 
q. 2 dominus, nec enim debet quis de victoria magis quam de veritate esse 
sollicitus28.  
 
6. The relationship between the defense lawyer and his client. 
In criminal trials, the issue of acting truthfully also applied to the 
relationship between the lawyer and his client, and specifically as regarded 
the advice a lawyer could give his client in preparation for questioning. 
There was a real chance that a lawyer could instruct his client to deny 
having committed the crime, and indeed criminal law scholars had debated 
over the possibility of having a court official be present whenever a lawyer 
 
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 71 art. 3. 
28 A. Alciatus, De verborum significatione, Francofurti 1617, col. 1044.  
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met with his client in order to monitor the lawyer’s conduct. Nonetheless, 
this possibility was flatly rejected towards the end of the sixteenth century 
in the additio to Claro’ Liber quintus, wherein it was stated that the 
conversations between lawyer and client were to be free from external 
influence or interference. In this way, the client could state all of the facts 
to his lawyer without concealing any details, and the lawyer could thus 
prepare the most appropriate line of defense: 
 
Adde quod dato termino defensionis reus debet reduci ad carceres 
inferiores, idest ad largam, ut possit loqui cum Procuratoribus et Advocatis 
et ordinare suas defensiones […] ut per Straccham in adnota. ad Cravet. in 
consil. 35 ubi tamen laudat illos iudices qui aliquo officiali Curiae assistente 
admittunt defensores rei ad alloquendum, ne instruantur rei et ne occasio 
detur veritatem occultandi […] Ego autem hoc non approbo quia si libera 
non est locutio libere non sunt defensiones, nam advocati et procuratores 
timore illius officialis, seu potius fisci, vel accusatoris exploratoris non 
audenìbunt dicere omnia quae facerent ad defensionem29.  
 
In the first half of the sixteenth century, Egidio Bossi had posed the 
question of whether a lawyer could instruct his client to remain silent if the 
latter risked capital punishment: 
 
quaero an quando ingeritur poena sanguinis possit advocatus vel causidicus 
instruere reum ad tacendam veritatem? […] ubi advocatus videt clientem 
suum fovere iniustam causam, non debet eum docere ut veritatem taceat, 
imo debet ei consilium dare ut restituat quod indebite tenet, sine scandalo 
tamen30.  
 
The objective of a criminal trial at the time was to ascertain the truth, 
and that required a contribution on the part of the defendant as well. Thus, 
the defendant was considered a witness, leading Bossi to forbid a lawyer 
from counseling his client on what answers to give (or not to give) during 
questioning, because doing so would have amounted to fabricating 
evidence.  
 
29 G.B. Baiardi, additio ad G. Claro, Liber quintus sive Practica criminalis, Venetiis, 1626, 
p. 426b, n. 3.  
30 E. Bossi, Tractatus varii, Lugduni, 1562, p. 142a, n. 18  
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Although it was acknowledged that a defendant would be naturally 
inclined to lie (this was connected with the principle of nemo tenetur se 
detegere, which was beginning to be recognized as a natural right of the 
accused), treatises on the legal profession reaffirmed that a party under 
questioning could not deny the crimes he committed. Consequently, the 
lawyer, too, could not build his defense on lies. At most, a lawyer could 
counsel his client on how to answer questions without admitting to the 
crime, but without expressly denying it either31. 
 
7. The accused under questioning: Conflict between the search for 
truth and the right to counsel. 
It must be understood how a lawyer’s position can be reconciled with 
that of the client, given that the former is bound to respect the truth in 
accordance with ethical principles, while the latter is not. It would also be 
interesting to do a comparative study of this issue with common law 
systems, where the defendant is required to tell the truth if he decides to 
talk. 
Indeed, the relationship between a lawyer and his client in a criminal 
trial has been the subject of debate since the early modern period. 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this issue influenced 
the debate over whether a defense lawyer was to be barred from assisting 
his client during questioning32. Not only did this represent an attack on the 
professional values of the legal profession, it also affected the public’s trust 
(or distrust) of lawyers. 
The issue came to the fore in 1970, when the Italian Constitutional 
Court ruled that a lawyer was finally allowed to counsel his client during 
questioning. The ruling highlighted the key role played by legal ethics in 
balancing the search for truth with the right to counsel – indeed, on no 
 
31 Ala, Tractatus brevis de advocato, cit., pp. 95-96; Xammar, De officio iudicis et 
advocati, cit., f. 232ra, n. 39 
32 L. Garlati, Silenzio colpevole, silenzio innocente. L’interrogatorio dell’imputato da 
mezzo di prova a strumento di difesa nell’esperienza giuridica italiana, in Riti, tecniche, 
interessi. Il processo penale tra Otto e Novecento. Atti del Convegno (Foggia, 5-6 maggio 
2006), M.N. Miletti (ed.), Milano, 2006, pp. 265-339. 
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other occasion were these two principles more at odds than during 
questioning33. 
The Constitutional Court’s ruling concerned the constitutionality of 
article 304 bis of the 1930 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
appeared to violate article 24 of the Italian constitution because it barred 
defense lawyers from assisting their clients during questioning. Specifically, 
the Constitutional Court ruled on the so-called ‘small reform’ of 1955, 
which had expanded a defendant’s right to counsel in the investigatory 
phase of legal proceedings – allowing defense lawyers to assist during the 
re-enactment of crimes, the gathering of expert evidence, house searches, 
and eyewitness identification (basically a return to the 1913 Code of 
Criminal Procedure) – but which continued to bar lawyers from assisting 
clients during questioning34. 
The Constitutional Court stated that excluding a lawyer in this way was 
ascribable to the «utter distrust of a defense lawyer’s work», that is the 
fear that a lawyer could influence a defendant’s statements and thus 
hinder the search for truth. However, such fear was «in stark contrast with 
the constitution, which clearly postulates that the right to counsel, far from 
being a hindrance, is perfectly in line with the aims of justice which a trial 
seeks to fulfill». 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court affirmed that an expansion of the 
powers of a defense lawyer needed to be accompanied by an expansion of 
their responsibilities as well, so that the right to counsel would not hinder 
the search for truth during trial. To that end, disciplinary bodies would 
have to ensure that lawyers respected their ethical duties. 
 
8. Concluding remarks. 
The affirmation of these constitutional values only highlights the difficult 
situation facing a defense lawyer as he seeks to balance conflicting 
 
33 Corte Cost., 16 dicembre 1970 n. 190. 
34 It should be noted that this expansion of the right to counsel only applied to formal 
preliminary investigations; see C. Storti, Magistratura e diritto di difesa nell'istruzione 
penale. Il dibattito sui periodici giuridici (1955-1965), in Diritti individuali e processo penale 
nell'Italia Repubblicana. Ferrara, 12-13 novembre 2010, D. Negri, M. Pifferi (edd.), Milano, 
2011, pp. 179-198. 
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interests during trial. Indeed, on the one hand he must act in the interests 
of his client, while on the other hand he must contribute to the 
administration of justice.  
The question is: can a defense lawyer do both?  
Luigi Ferrajoli has stated that although these values seem to be in 
conflict, they can actually be compatible thanks to a lawyer’s duty of 
independence towards both the judge and the client. Indeed, a lawyer is 
not ‘a conscience for hire’, as Dostoyevsky once wrote35. He does not need 
to comply with his client’s requests if he does not think it appropriate; 
rather, he must independently make choices of both a technical and non-
technical nature regarding how to best carry out the defense, while still 
respecting the interests of his client36. 
Such choices are often the result of outright dilemmas facing a defense 
lawyer. Ethical rules provide criteria and limits to deal with these 
quandaries, but in certain circumstances the lawyer can also rely on his 
own ethical principles. Thus, legal ethics do not end with the Code of 
Conduct; on the contrary, as Aldo Caslinuovo once stated, a lawyer must 
«first and foremost feel it deep inside his soul, in the vibrations of his own 
conscience»37. 
 
 
35 F. Dostoevskij, I fratelli Karamazov, Milano, 1974, p. 257. 
36 L. Ferrajoli, Sulla deontologia professionale degli avvocati, in «Questione Giustizia», 
2011, pp. 90-98. 
37 A. Casalinuovo, Deontologia del difensore, in «Rassegna Forense», 1981, pp. 447-
460. 
